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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jay Burnet appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion when 
it revoked his probation, or alternatively, by not further reducing his sentence when it did 
so. He also contends that the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the 
inclusion of the transcripts of the June 24, 2009, change of plea hearing, the July 22, 
2009, sentencing hearing and the February 4, 2010, rider review hearing in the 
appellate record, such that, even under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
State v. Brunet,_ Idaho_, 316 P.3d 640 (2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision to deny his motion to augment the record with these transcripts violated 
his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, this Court 
should grant Mr. Burnet access to the requested transcripts and allow him the 
opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those 
transcripts. 
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district 
court's order revoking Mr. Burnet' s probation and remand this case for an order placing 
him on probation. Alternatively, this Court should either reduce his sentence as it sees 
fit or remand the case so the district court can reduce his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Burnet agreed to plead guilty to the 
charge of eluding (hereinafter, 2009 case), and in exchange, the State would dismiss a 
persistent violator enhancement, and would recommend that the sentence would be 
concurrent with the sentences imposed in two other cases, for which Mr. Burnet had 
1 
been on probation. (R., p.71.) Mr. Burnet also admitted to violating his probation in 
those other cases (hereinafter, 2004 case and 2007 case). 1 
Mr. Burnet had been successfully participating in the mental health drug court for 
a substantial period of time prior to the 2009 eluding charge. (R., pp.82, 126.) He 
suffers from major depression. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
p.15.)2 The 2009 eluding charge had been triggered by an episode arising from an 
argument with his mother over his girlfriend, and Mr. Burnet' s attempt at suicide using 
an intoxicating inhalant. (PSI, p.2.) As such, the presentence investigation indicated 
that Mr. Burnet would need long-term treatment in a stable environment to rehabilitate. 
(PSI, p.15.) To that end, Mr. Burnet had applied for, and was determined to be a good 
candidate for participation in, the program at Good Samaritan Rehabilitation run by 
Pastors Tim Remington and Mike Slothower. (R., pp.73-74.) 
However, the district court decided that Mr. Burnet should participate in a rider 
program before starting in the Good Samaritan program. (R., p.83.) As such, it revoked 
Mr. Burnet's probation and executed the sentences from the 2004 and 2007 cases 
(each a seven-year unified sentence, with three years fixed, to be served concurrently 
with each other). (R., p.87.) In the 2009 case, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with five years fixed to be served consecutive to the 2004 and 
1 While the 2004 and 2007 cases were consolidated with the 2009 case in the district 
court, the notice of appeal only applies to the 2009 case, given that Mr. Burnet had to 
win back his right to appeal the decision to revoke his probation in the 2009 case via 
rost-conviction. (See R., pp.148-59.) 
PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file "Jay 
Morris Burnet sealed 40840." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the 
documents attached thereto (addendum from rider staff, letters from Good Samaritan 
Rehabilitation, etc.). 
2 
2007 sentences. (R., p.87.) As a result, Mr. Burnet was faced with an aggregate 
sentence of twelve years, with eight years fixed, for those three cases. 
Mr. Burnet performed well in the rider program, completing, or anticipating 
completion in, all of his assigned programs, as well as some voluntary programs. (PSI, 
p.34.) He also received no formal disciplinary sanctions during his period of retained 
jurisdiction. (PSI, p.34.) As such, the rider staff recommended that Mr. Burnet be 
placed on probation. (PSI, p.33.) The district court agreed, and suspended all three of 
Mr. Burnet's sentences for a four-year period of probation. (R., pp.170-71.) 
On probation, Mr. Burnet began attending the program at Good Samaritan 
Rehabilitation. (See R., pp.109-12.) He graduated from their program and agreed to 
continue with their aftercare program. (PSI, p.44.) However, a conflict with Pastor 
Remington led to his dismissal from the aftercare program. (PSI, p.45.) Upon receiving 
this news, the district court initiated probation violation proceedings sua sponte. 
(R., pp.116-17.) However, Mr. Burnet was continuing to work with Pastor Slothower, a 
situation which his probation officer and both pastors felt constituted adequate 
continued treatment. (PSI, p.45; R., pp.121-23.) The district court found that Mr. Burnet 
was not being truthful in regard to the conflict with Pastor Remington, but noting the fact 
that he had been participating in an equivalent treatment program, it decided to continue 
Mr. Burnet on probation. (R., p.124.) 
However, Mr. Burnet was subsequently charged with driving under the influence 
of an intoxicant and leaving the scene of a property-damage accident.3 (R., pp.125-26.) 
3 The new charge also constituted a separate case (hereinafter, the 2011 case), which 
is not included in this appeal. Rather, an appeal challenging the sentence ultimately 
imposed in that case was resolved in Docket Number 39302. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the sentence imposed in that case. State v. Burnet, 2012 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 517 (Ct. App. 2012). A remittitur issued on June 22, 2012. 
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The State also filed a motion for probation violation in Mr. Burnet's other cases based 
on those new charges. (R., pp.125-27.) 
Mr. Burnet subsequently explained that the new charges were the result of losing 
his job and his father's hospitalization. (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.2.) He also noted that, 
had he not been on probation and available to get his father to a medical facility quickly, 
his father would probably have died. (Tr., p.21, Ls.10-18.) He indicated that the only 
reason he had delayed entering the guilty plea in this case was so that he would be able 
to help his parents with his father's initial post-surgery care. (Tr., p.20, Ls.10-13.) 
In the 2011 case, Mr. Burnet and the State initially reached a plea agreement, 
whereby Mr. Burnet would plead guilty to DUI, and the State would dismiss the other 
two counts alleged. (See Tr., p.3, Ls.7-9.) That plea agreement was intended to be 
binding on the district court, and would have resulted in a maximum unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed, in the 2011 case, to be served concurrent to the 2004 
and 2007 sentences, although the defense was free to argue for less than that 
maximum sentence. (Tr., p.3, Ls.12-18.) The district court refused to be bound by that 
agreement, as it was particularly concerned with the concurrent sentence aspect of the 
proposed sentence. (Tr., p.3, Ls.19-20; Tr., p.4, Ls.5-8.) 
The parties and the district court then discussed an alternative plea agreement, 
whereby Mr. Burnet would enter the same plea, but would receive a ten-year unified 
sentence, with zero years fixed, in the 2011 case, to be served consecutively to all the 
other sentences. (Tr., p.7, L.3 - p.9, L.4.) Under such an agreement, Mr. Burnet would 
face an aggregate sentence of twenty-two years, with eight years fixed. Mr. Burnet pied 
guilty pursuant to the modified agreement and waived his right to a two-day delay 
before sentencing, as well as his right to a new presentence investigation report. 
4 
(Tr., p.15, L.11 - p.17, L.7.) The district court proceeded to impose a new sentence in 
the 2011 case and executed his sentences in the 2004 and 2007 cases without 
modification. (R., pp.145-46.) However, in the 2009 case, the district court reduced 
Mr. Burnet's sentence, so that it was for a unified term of five years, with only four years 
fixed. (R., p.146.) The result of the September 1, 2011, order was that Mr. Burnet 
faced an aggregate sentence of twenty-two years, with seven years fixed, less credit for 
time served. (R., pp.145-46.) 
Mr. Burnet subsequently obtained post-conviction relief because his attorney had 
failed to file a notice of appeal in the 2009 case, despite Mr. Burnet's request that he do 
so. (R., pp.148-50.) As a result, the district court re-entered the order revoking his 
probation so that Mr. Burnet could exercise his right to appeal.4 (R., pp.152-157.) 
Mr. Burnet filed a timely notice of appeal from that re-entered order revoking his 
probation in the 2009 case. (R., pp.158-59.) 
On appeal, Mr. Burnet moved to augment the appellate record with transcripts 
from three hearings: the change of plea hearing held on June 24, 2009, the sentencing 
hearing held on July 22, 2009, and the rider review hearing held on February 4, 2010. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof, filed July 11, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without 
prejudice because Mr. Burnet had not demonstrated that the requested transcripts were 
necessary to a specific issue on appeal. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to 
4 The district court's order bears all four case numbers and is captioned as "Amended 
Judgment and Sentence and Notice of Right to Appeal." (R., p.152 (emphasis from 
orginal).) However, the order itself recognizes that post-conviction relief was granted, 
and so states, "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this Court's September 1, 2011, 'Judgment 
and Sentence and Notice of Right to Appeal,' as fully set forth below, is RE-ENTERED 
on January 26, 2013." (R., pp.152-53.) 
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Suspend the Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice, dated July 29, 2013 (emphasis from 
original).) Mr. Burnet renewed his motion, explaining why the requested transcripts 
were necessary to the issues he anticipated pursuing on appeal. (Renewed Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed 
September 9, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the renewed motion without 
explanation. (Order Denying Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, dated October 15, 2013 (emphasis from original).) 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Burnet due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Burnet' s 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Burnet Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review 
Of The Issues On Appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are 
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet, 316 P.3d 640. Its 
opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, when reviewing 
decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, 
focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 644 (emphasis added) (citing 
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that 
there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts 
sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 643 (citing Mayer v. City of 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)). 
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process 
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. 
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho 
at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 
221, 227 (1998). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established on 
8 
several occasions. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)5; Burns v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, 404 
U.S. 189. Its decisions have established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of 
the due process and equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of 
indigent defendants is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate 
record for appellate review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary 
materials. See, e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the 
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for 
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional 
transcripts."6 Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("[W]here the 
5 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
6 "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate 
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... 
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 
support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); 
see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 805 (1996) {applying this presumption in absence 
of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Burnet fails to provide the appellate court with 
the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Burnet's claims regarding the relinquishment of jurisdiction will not be addressed on 
9 
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, 
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' 
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds."). 
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of all three 
requested transcripts in the appellate record. The minutes of the June 24, 2009, 
change of plea hearing reveal that a witness, Tim Remington, was called and he gave 
testimony apparently about an alternative rehabilitation program for Mr. Burnet. 
(R., pp.73-74.) The minutes do not seem to provide a verbatim recounting of Pastor 
Remington's testimony, but rather, a summary or highlights of his testimony.7 (See 
R., pp.73-74.) However, since that testimony appears to speak to the sentencing factor 
of rehabilitation, it is relevant to the district court's sentencing determinations. See, e.g., 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993); State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 
(Ct. App. 1982). Additionally, the district court indicated it was making changes to the 
their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court not 
affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective appeal, 
making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection grounds. 
See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally 
invalid ... to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added). 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having 
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection 
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. 
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at 
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing 
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating 
Mr. Burnet, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). 
7 Since the minutes do are not clear regarding the entirety of the statements, they are 
insufficient to provide an adequate appellate record in regard to Mr. Burnet's challenge 
that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and executed 
the sentence imposed at the July 17, 2003, hearing. Compare Brunet,_ Idaho_, 
2013 WL 6001894, p.3 (discussing how the minutes in the record of that case were 
sufficient to provide an adequate appellate record). 
10 
information. (R., p.72.) While the record does show the changes that were made, it 
does not indicate why. (See R., pp.60-61.) In order to properly review the sentence 
imposed, it is necessary to know the factual basis for the underlying charges to which 
Mr. Burnet pied guilty. Therefore, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for 
a transcript of the June 24, 2009 change of plea hearing. 
The grounds of appeal also make out a colorable need for inclusion of the 
transcript from the July 22, 2009, sentencing hearing. The minutes of that hearing 
indicate Mr. Burnet made several statements to the district court. (R., pp.80-84.) 
Those minutes do indicate that the statements were mitigating in nature. For example, 
"I've been continuing Celebrate to Recovery in the jail ... accepted into Remington's 
program." (R., p.81.) However, as with the minutes from the change of plea hearing, 
the minutes of the sentencing hearing are not clear as to whether these are verbatim 
recitations of all of Mr. Burnet's statements or simply the highlights. (See generally 
R., pp.80-84.) When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a sentencing 
hearing, those comments are relevant to the district court's sentencing determinations. 
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied, 
(finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally 
protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested). Therefore, 
the defendant's statements in allocution are highly relevant to the district court's 
disposition on a probation violation. See, e.g., Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; Toohi/1, 
103 Idaho at 568. As a result, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the 
transcript of the July 22, 2009, sentencing hearing. 
11 
Additionally, since rider review hearings deal with similar concerns as sentencing 
hearings and the decisions at both hearings are guided by the same factors, the 
defendant's statements at rider review hearings are highly relevant to the district court's 
disposition. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). The minutes from the rider review hearing held on 
February 4, 2010, indicate that Mr. Burnet made statements to the district court, which 
included comments about the impact his medications had on during the period of 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.95-98.) The minutes also indicate that a witness, "Tim, 
Pastor," offered insight on providing rehabilitation opportunities to Mr. Burnet. 
(R., p.97.) As both sets of statements impact a district court's sentencing decisions, the 
grounds of appeal also make out a colorable need for inclusion of the rider review 
transcript in the appellate record. 
The only other question, then, is whether the evidence provided at that hearing 
was part of the entire record available to the district court when it subsequently decided 
to revoke Mr. Burnet's probation. See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 644; Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5. 
The district court is entitled to rely upon the knowledge gained from its own official 
position and observations, and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior 
proceedings in a case. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); 
see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the 
trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during 
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court 
could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has 
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein 
involved"); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that 
12 
the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 
495 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what 
he already knew about [the defendant] from the other case"). Since the same district 
court judge who revoked Mr. Burnet' s probation also presided over all three of the 
hearings at issue (compare R., pp.70-75, 80-84, 95-98, 138-40, 143-47), the statements 
made during those hearings are part of the record that was available to the district court 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Burnet. 
Therefore, because there is a colorable need for those transcripts and the 
information therein was part of the record before the district court, the decision to deny 
Mr. Burnet access to those transcripts deprived him of an adequate appellate record, 
and thus, violated his right to due process.8 See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643. 
8 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate Mr. Burnet's 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), 
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). Appellate counsel is required 
to make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best 
arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The 
standards for effective appellate representation are set forth in the American Bar 
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can 
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on 
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to 
revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Burnet 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Burnet' s Probation, Or, 
Alternatively, By Not Further Reducing His Sentence When It Did So 
A. The Decision To Revoke Mr. Burnet's Probation Constitutes An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
Mr. Brunet asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his unified sentence of five years, with four years fixed, to be 
served consecutively with various other sentences, was an abuse of the district court's 
discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court's discretion. 
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court must determine 
"whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of 
the probation is consistent with the protection of society." Id. The Legislature has 
established the criteria for determining whether probation or incarceration is merited. 
Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648 ( citing I. C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the 
appellate courts use a multi-tiered inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choice before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 ( citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 600 (1989)). 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard 
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; 
on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. Therefore, Mr. Burnet has 
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims 
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
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(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. 
Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also 
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 
at 568. This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other 
objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). These same factors are 
appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation. See 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009). 
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Burnet. As a 
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Burnet's probation was adequately 
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Burnet 
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through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
For example, Mr. Burnet has been diagnosed with major depression, recurrent. 
(PSI, p.15.) The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523 
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). In that regard, the record indicates 
Mr. Burnet was able, for the most part, to control his condition (see, e.g., PSI, p.15), and 
therefore, be successful in long-term treatment programs. For example, he was able to 
complete the Good Samaritan treatment program and agreed to continue with its 
aftercare program. (PSI, p.44; see also R., pp.121-23 (testimony from leaders of the 
Good Samaritan program, revealing that, when Mr. Burnet had a conflict with one of the 
counselors, he resolved the issue by switching to a different counselor, and did so 
without missing a meeting); see also R., p.82 (indicating that Mr. Burnet did well in the 
mental health court program for "a long time"); PSI, pp.33-344 (rider staff 
recommending Mr. Burnet for probation based on his completion or anticipated 
completion of all his assigned programs, as well as a few voluntary programs).) Thus, 
the evidence indicates that Mr. Burnet is able to conform to the requirements of 
probation and be a productive member of society. 
The record also indicates that the reason for Mr. Burnet' s violation of the terms of 
his probation in the 2009 case was the combination of losing his job and his father's 
hospitalization. (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.2.) Mr. Burnet also indicated that the only 
reason he did not immediately plead guilty was so that he could be available to help 
with his father's initial post-surgery care. (Tr., p.20, Ls.10-13.) Such acknowledgment 
of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical steps in the 
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rehabilitation process. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). The 
fact that Mr. Burnet was willing to work out a new plea agreement after the district court 
rejected his first plea agreement on the new violations also indicates his desire to 
accept responsibility. (See Tr., p.3, L.12 - p.8, L.24.) Additionally, family constitutes an 
important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See id. at 817 
(holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not 
equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the 
support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of 
consideration). This information also demonstrates that Mr. Burnet is an important 
member of his family, and that the support network there benefits both Mr. Burnet and 
his family. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence, 
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and 
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the 
imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the 
district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original 
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sentence if Mr. Burnet were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it 
could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. What the 
probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity to 
continue rehabilitating in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Burnet to continue to apply 
the lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting, and continue to 
be a productive member of society. 
B. The Decision To Not Further Reduce Mr. Burnet's Sentence When The District 
Court Revoked His Probation Constitutes An Abuse Of Discretion 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Burnet's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Burnet' s sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides to resume the execution 
of the underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce 
the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant _to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 782 
(2008). 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in 
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohill, 
103 Idaho at 568 (identifying the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the 
district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light 
of the mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure 
to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 
489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
18 
A sufficient examination of all these factors, as discussed in Section ll(A), supra, 
reveals that a more lenient sentence,9 would still address all the sentencing objectives. 
By imposing a more lenient sentence the district court would still execute a sentence 
against Mr. Burnet. Thus, even a reduced sentence could still provide for a significant 
period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration. Such a sentence would punish 
Mr. Burnet by depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but several of 
his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. 
Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient sentence. 
See, e.g., Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15. The district court would not lose anything in 
terms of protection of society, deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient 
sentence. Society would receive equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Burnet 
would be in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. He would be 
unable to harm society during the period of initial incarceration, and the parole board 
would maintain the discretion to release him again, or, if need be, continue to keep him 
in prison. 
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence 
would not is the opportunity to continue rehabilitating, and as the Supreme Court has 
noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 
Idaho 394,402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 
228 (1971). Specifically, it would give Mr. Burnet the opportunity to return to his family 
and continue to offer and receive support in that community. Delaying access to 
rehabilitative alternatives would actually decrease the protection for society in the long 
9 In this case, a more lenient sentence might manifest as a further reduction in the term 
of the sentence in the 2009 case, or an order that it be served concurrently with the 
other sentences, or both. 
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term because prison does not decrease the risk for recidivism as effectively as a 
sentence focused on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect society would be 
to provide Mr. Burnet with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do so will result in lesser 
protection for society in the long term, which means the sentence fails to sufficiently 
address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires modification. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burnet respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Burnet respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his probation and remand this case 
for an order placing him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce 
his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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